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Neuropolitics is the intersection of neuroscience and political science, which has the 
interdisciplinary goal of transforming both disciplines. This article reviews the past 20 years of 
work in the field, identifying its roots, some overarching themes (reactions to political attitudinal 
questions and candidates faces, identification of political ideology based on brain structure or 
reactivity to nonpolitical stimuli, and racial attitudes),, and obstacles to its progress. I then 
explore the methodological and analytical advances that point the way forward for the future of 
neuropolitics. Though the field has been slow to develop compared with neurolaw and 
neuroeconomics, innovations look ripe for dramatically improving our ability to model political 
behaviors and attitudes in individuals and predict political choices in mass publics.  The coming 
advancements, however, pose risks to our current norms of democratic deliberation and 
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“In an earlier period, the behaviorist decree that subjective states lie beyond the 
realm of proper measurement gave Mannheim a justification for turning his back on 
measurement… Nevertheless, while rapid strides in the measurement of ‘subjective’ 
states have been achieved in recent decades, few would claim that the millennium 
has arrived …” – Philip Converse 1  
 
 While the millennium has arrived and passed, the progress on the measurement of 
subjective states is still in its early days and the “friendship” 2 between neuroscience and politics 
is still in the acquaintance stage. Neuropolitics is a more recent manifestation of an inquiry into 
human nature stretching back thousands of years 3. Converging lines of evidence have shown 
that our engagement with and creation of the political world we live in is related to our being 
human and having the brains that humans do.  Our brains appear to be built for politics, a 
consequence of a three million year old cognitive arms race propelled by a need to manage our 
increasingly dynamic social complexity4. 
 Though Aristotle’s 5 claim that we are political animals has stood the test of time, it is 
clear that we are not the only political animals 6. Many other species have the sophisticated 
brains needed to manage complex coalitional dynamics among non-kin. Chimpanzees and many 
other primates demonstrate interactions familiar to political scientists 7. But it is not just our 
nearest cousins that show this ability: hyenas 8 and dolphins 9 illustrate the forces of convergent 
evolution with unusual brains and unusually complex coalitional dynamics. 
 But, a political science focused on any of these other species would be different from the 
field that has developed around the study of human politics over the past two millennia. This is 
true to at least some degree due to the way the human brain has evolved. Neuropolitics is a 
relatively new field connecting research in political science and neuroscience, which has the 
interdisciplinary goal of transforming both fields. If human nature is political, then studying our 
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brain without considering its role in politics is just as flawed as ignoring the brain when studying 
politics. 
 This article begins by briefly recounting the historical opposition to investigations of the 
role of the brain and biology in politics along with noting some of the first attempts at drawing 
connections. In the next section, I note how the fields of cognitive science and neuroscience 
came together but were missing a tool that would enable investigations in a critical range of 
temporal and spatial scales. Soon after, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) provided 
that missing piece and the nascent research area rapidly coalesced into a field of study. The next 
section describes how studies of social cognition began to take advantage of brain imaging to 
illuminate functions of a variety of brain regions that had been previously underappreciated or 
understood in only a limited way. 
 After that I describe the first theoretical and then empirical discoveries as neuropolitics 
research began to be reported. I then contrast the development of neuropolitics with the far more 
prolific work in the adjacent fields of neurolaw and neuroeconomics. Finally, I review a range of 
promising new innovations in methods and analytical strategies that I expect will enable 
neuropolitics to move towards its potential and overcome some of the current constraints that 
hold back the field. It has been 20 years since I sketched out my first research proposal for the 
studies of political questions using functional imaging 10. The field has developed substantially, 
but it still has the potential to go much further. 
Early impediments and first steps 
 Resistance to connecting politics to the brain has deep historical and intellectual roots. 
Aristotle 11 analogized the human mind to a blank writing tablet but did link the type of soul an 
entity had to its biology (i.e. humans have a rational soul, animals have a sensing soul, and plants 
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have a vegetative soul). During the Renaissance, René Descartes’ 12 philosophy separated the 
mind from the body. And, just after Descartes, John Locke’s 13 expansion of Aristotle’s analogy 
into a full-fledged argument about human nature shifted investigations in the social sciences for 
centuries away from embodied forms of cognition 14. Locke’s role in foreclosing a potential 
function for biology in human nature is ironic given that he was earlier part of an important 
group investigating the anatomy and architecture of the brain 15. 
 While Sigmund Freud 16 was similarly trained in neurology, even his early work 
emphasized functions of the mind over structures of the brain. Both psychoanalysis and later 
reactions to it like behaviorism 17 directed focus away from biological explanations of 
psychological phenomena. For the psychoanalyst, experiences of the mind and their 
interpretations were central considerations. For the behaviorist, observations about responses to 
stimuli were the primary interest, regardless of which biological species happened to be doing 
the responding. Any potential interplay of biological factors in either of these dominant 
paradigms was put decidedly aside. 
 The behaviorist emphasis in the early to mid-20th century heavily influenced political 
science’s agenda and approaches to political questions were often focused on observable 
behaviors such as voting or expressions of attitudes, rather than exploring a potential role for the 
brain or biology 18. As rational choice theory migrated from economics to politics 19, yet another 
impediment was laid for understanding how brains might influence political decision making. 
Anthony Downs’ five-part definition of rationality, for example, gives no role for the potential 
emotional, biological, or neurological factors that might bend our political will. 
 Examinations of a potential connection between biology and politics was made 
particularly unpalatable for many in the mid-1900s given the role of biology in Nazi rhetoric 
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justifying their atrocities 20. However, by the 1970s some researchers had started using biological 
methods to investigate political questions. John Wahlke and Milton Lodge 21 employed 
physiological measures of arousal to investigate political attitudes. Lindon Eaves and Hans 
Eysenck 22 showed that attitudes demonstrated evidence of biological heredity. And, in what may 
be the first study of neuropolitics, Roger Sperry and colleagues 23 investigated attitudes towards 
political figures in both hemispheres of split-brain patients. 
 In most human brains, the corpus callosum is a bundle of white matter fibers that connect 
the left and right hemisphere and enable communication between them. In cases of severe 
epilepsy, this connection may be severed in order to reduce the symptoms of the disease, 
resulting in a split-brain. Sperry and his colleagues presented a range of stimuli, including photos 
of Hitler and Nixon, to only one eye at a time in order to evaluate whether both hemispheres of 
the brain were capable of reporting attitudes towards these political stimuli. While this type of 
work garnered a Nobel Prize for Sperry, it is important for neuropolitics as a reminder of the 
potential gains from using clinical cases and lesion studies in digging into our assumptions about 
political cognition. Much of our early knowledge about how the brain and mind function 
together came from studies of patients who had experienced damage to one region or another. 
While other tools have emerged and will continue to develop, the opportunities to untangle 
insights from clinical cases remain important. 
fMRI and the foundations of cognitive neuroscience 
 A seminal paper by Patricia Churchland and Terry Sejnowski 24 includes a figure that 
illustrates the tools available at the time that enabled the study of neuroscientific phenomena. 
The figure shows the temporal (X axis) and spatial scales (Y axis) that those tools covered. Brain 
lesion studies, for instance, sit in the upper right hand side, covering a temporal scale of days to 
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years and a spatial scale of millimeters to centimeters. While the illustration maps the spatial and 
temporal scales covered by the contemporary methods available in the 1980s, the figure looks 
like a puzzle with a critical missing piece.  There was simple no tool available to study the brain 
at the temporal scale from seconds to hours and the spatial scale from cubic millimeters to the 
whole brain. Despite this gap, the authors argued that there was a developing convergence that 
would undermine the conventional independence of neuroscience and cognitive science. In the 
following years, the new field of cognitive neuroscience emerged, but progress was dramatically 
accelerated as the new technique of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) arose, 
coming in like the perfect puzzle piece to fill in the hole that had been mapped out in the 
Churchland and Sejnowski paper. 
 Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) devices create extremely powerful fields that 
provoke distinct patterns of magnetic flux around the protons that make up the hydrogen in the 
water within our body. Small differences in the polarization of these protons then enable the 
imaging of structures and differentiation of tissues within the human body 25. While MRI creates 
static images of structure akin to a photograph, fMRI relies on a series of images in sequence like 
the frames of a film that allow researchers to detect change in cerebral blood flow over time. 
 Oxygenated blood is pumped to feed the brain and it has a slightly different magnetic 
signature when compared to the blood that has been deoxygenated as the brain’s neural tissue 
absorbs this needed fuel from the supplied blood. The blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 
magnetic signal varies with shifts in the level of oxygen in the blood and changes from image to 
image as the brain functions and different neural regions require different levels of metabolic 
activity. Early neuroscience research, such as studies by Paul Broca 26, had shown that certain 
cognitive functions appeared to be at least partially localized to particular brain regions. 
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 The first wave of fMRI studies suggested that there were changes in metabolic activity in 
specific brain areas as participants engaged in specific cognitive tasks. Thus, discrete mental 
functions could be associated with discrete brain structures. The effect on the new field of 
cognitive neuroscience was dramatic. As Peter Bandettini 25 and others have shown, dozens, then 
hundreds, and then thousands of papers were soon being published using fMRI each year.  
 The temporal resolution of seconds to hours meant that many types of well-developed 
cognitive science and psychological studies could be replicated while participants were 
undergoing brain scanning. Though not able to obtain the millisecond precision of contemporary 
electroencephalogram (EEG) techniques, fMRI benefited from a spatial resolution of millimeters 
and could provide data for the full depth of the human brain, rather than merely inferences from 
the surface. Additionally, fMRI could be easily and ethically performed with healthy participants 
rather than requiring the injection of radioactive agents as in Positron Emission Tomography 
(PET) or relying on severe brain damage as lesion studies had. The combination of temporal 
resolution from seconds to hours, spatial resolution of millimeters across the whole brain, and the 
very low invasiveness and risks of the method provided an exciting and powerful new tool, 
which filled the gap highlighted by Churchland and Sejnowski 24.  
 Just as fMRI was first developing, I first encountered this research in an article by 
functional imaging pioneer Marcus Raichle 27 in Scientific American. The initial studies focused 
on replicating existing cognitive and perceptual studies and reinforcing existing theories of 
functional localization. A typical study involved having participants perform a new task while 
being imaged with fMRI and then rescanning them after they had practiced the task extensively. 
Such practice related paradigms had been employed in measures of cognition all the way back to 
the early work of F.C. Donders 28, who measured the amount of time that tasks took in order to 
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infer their cognitive complexity and demands. In a happy confirmation, brain imaging during 
language-related tasks, such as conjugating verbs in an unfamiliar language, involved the same 
region that Broca had identified in his lesion studies of people with language difficulties. Results 
across a wide range of tasks showed that additional oxygenated blood flowed into a region 
believed to be critical for that task when the task was relatively novel. With practice, the amount 
of time required for the task diminished and the blood flow to the involved region also 
decreased. Expertise appeared to demand less mental effort even as performance continued to 
improve. 
 My interest in brain imaging was spurred on as I read the work of Phillip Converse 1, 
John Zaller 29 and others for the first time as a new graduate student at UCLA in the early 2000s. 
The repeated conclusion in this literature was that people who knew a lot about national politics 
thought differently than those who had not attended to it much. To me, this sounded similar to 
the practice related effects that Raichle had been writing about and I suggested brain imaging as 
a potential tool for investigating political cognition. Though initially skeptical, Zaller later 
suggested that I could test at least my broad hypothesis using Donders’ methodology with the 
first available American National Election Studies dataset to include response latency measures 
that came out in 1998. While the available data weakly supported the idea of quantifying 
cognitive differences between political novices and sophisticates using response latency 10, a 
much richer dataset was generously provided by Robert Huckfeldt 30 and this bolstered both the 
central theory and the potential for using fMRI.  
 Converse’s 1 claims that novices made political judgments with the cognitive equivalent 
of mental coin flips implied little intellectual effort and thus would suggest very short response 
times when using Donders’ paradigm. It turned out, however, that people who did not know 
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much about politics took dramatically longer to answer political questions than those who were 
knowledgeable 31, consistent with the extensive literature on practice and rehearsal 32. The result 
functioned as a proof of concept and was sufficient to get me in the door at UCLA’s new Brain 
Mapping Division. 
 Traditional cognitive tasks dominated the initial work using functional brain imaging. For 
instance, early review pieces by Cabeza and Nyberg 33,34 highlighted studies investigating 
attention, Stroop tasks, language processing, memory encoding and retrieval, and skill learning. 
Social cognition was nearly entirely absent. The view emerging out of this work would not have 
led one to believe that man was, by nature, a political animal—but rather that we were roughly 
similar to the lab rats and pigeons so frequently investigated! 
From cognitive neuroscience to social cognitive neuroscience 
 Studies of racial perception and moral judgment were among the first social 
neuroimaging papers to gain attention. Elizabeth Phelps and colleagues 35 found that activity in 
the amygdala correlated with measures of implicit racial bias. Alexandra Golby and colleagues 36 
showed that patterns of activity in memory and face-related regions of the brain mirrored 
difficulties that Whites had in recalling Black faces. And, Joshua Greene and colleagues 37 
showed that differences in how people judge two seemingly equivalent moral problems were 
reflected in differences in brain activity. Soon, enough work was coalescing around social 
observations and brain imaging to enable a new field of social cognitive neuroscience to emerge 
onto the scene as a fully-fledged entity 38. 
 The first international Social Cognitive Neuroscience conference was held in 2001, 
bringing together a Tower of Babel like collection of senior academics from a range of 
disciplines who struggled for meaningful dialogue. A Google search for “social cognitive 
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neuroscience” would yield 53 hits that year39. While that initial conference meeting was 
characterized by senior scholars from fields like primatology, economics, and neuroscience with 
vastly different disciplinary views of terms as basic as trust, it was just a few years later that New 
York Times columnist David Brooks 39 described the meeting as “The Young and the Neuro.” 
After receiving the nod from senior scholars, younger scholars had quickly converged on a 
common language and were, for example, running neuroscience studies of monkeys playing the 
behavioral economist’s games, a dramatic example of E.O. Wilson’s 40 consilience as multiple 
fields converged on shared theories and methodologies.  This consilience manifested in the 
foundation of the journals Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience and Social Neuroscience. 
 In these early days, the literature of neuroscience experiments broadly relevant to politics 
was extremely limited, which led to difficulty with experimental design and data analysis. My 
original fMRI studies, the first to combine functional brain imaging and political science were 
run in 2001. At the time, the work was conducted on a 3 Tesla (a household refrigerator magnet 
is 0.005 Tesla) MRI scanner that had been specially modified to enable functional imaging and 
the data analysis took a 64 processor supercomputer that filled an entire floor three days to 
converge. By the end of the decade, fMRI scanners were readily accessible at many universities 
around the world and that same data analysis could be run in three days on a consumer iMac. 
 Social cognitive neuroscience advanced rapidly, with noticeable differences in flavor and 
approach between American and European research 41. Europeans developed work on theory of 
mind, mirror neurons, and empathy 42. In contrast, American researchers tended to be more 
individually focused with studies of self-knowledge, emotion regulation, and implicit attitudes. 
 Soon enough groundwork had been laid for the journal Political Psychology to 
commission a special issue on the intersections of neuroscience and political science. From this 
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early work through to the present, discussions of neuropolitics have focused on both promise and 
peril as repeated themes. While the measurement millennium prophesied by Converse in the 
opening quote had arrived, substantial and warranted criticism of fMRI’s ability to measure 
subjective states persisted. As Marcus Raichle 43 noted in a commentary to the special issue, the 
“tasks of interest are always associated with activity changes in large networks of brain areas 
with task-unique spatial and temporal properties.” Even in the best circumstances, converting 
data about task-related changes in brain activity into meaningful psychological insights, much 
less political processes, would continue to be a challenge. 
Neuropolitics: Initial findings 
 The special issue of Political Psychology in 2003 staked out a number of central themes 
that continue to be at the heart of investigations in neuropolitics today. John Cacioppo and Penny 
Visser 44 highlighted the difficulty in transcending many levels of analysis. Elizabeth Phelps and 
Laura Thomas 45 cautioned against the tendency to view results from neuroimaging as somehow 
more definitive than traditional psychological methods. And Matthew Lieberman and colleagues 
46 illustrated how well-established theories of brain function have implications for political 
phenomena and sketched out how cognitive neuroscience could be used to both generate theories 
of political behavior and test those theories. As reviews and critiques of neuropolitics have 
appeared in the literature in the years since, these early words about the area’s promises and 
perils continued to be echoed. 
 As neuropolitics transitioned from theoretical work to an experimental agenda, three 
themes in experimental design quickly emerged. One trend was exploring political attitudes with 
tasks where participants would report political attitudes in a manner roughly similar to the long 
tradition of answering survey questions in political science research. A second theme in research 
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was for investigators to look for variations in neural activity as participants viewed faces. A third 
theme involved the study of mechanisms of basic cognition and perception to identify 
distinctions between liberals and conservatives. 
 My own dissertation reflected the first two tendencies with experiments asking 
participants to report their political attitudes and others asking them to view faces or visual 
scenes. The first experiment showed the effect of experience regarding national politics on the 
cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in political attitudes, in particular the brain’s Default 
Mode Network 47 (a network of brain regions that is highly active when a person is at rest). Drew 
Westen and colleagues 48 likewise showed the same brain regions activated as politically 
knowledgeable participants answered political questions. Westen 49 extrapolated from these 
findings in his well-received popular book, The Political Brain. 
 Kristine Knutson and colleagues 50 investigated reactions to well known political faces 
using the Implicit Association Test and fMRI. Michael Spezio 51 and his collaborators looked at 
how we could use fMRI to understand the role of negative attributions towards losing candidates 
and the pattern of neural activation that corresponds with those negative perceptions. Jonas 
Kaplan et al. 52 also studied reactions to political faces, finding activity in regions often engaged 
in cognitive control when participants viewed candidates from the opposing party. 
 However, the first significant controversy arose soon after as some of the same team 
members described results from an fMRI study they had performed using faces of candidates in 
the upcoming presidential race in a New York Times Op-Ed 53. An immediate response signed by 
a number of prominent cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists criticized the inferences 
being made from the data and its lack of peer review 54. As I discuss below, it might possible to 
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infer the subjective mental states of individuals as they react to political candidates, but doing so 
requires a complex set of conditions that were not met in the research described in the Op-Ed. 
 While reactions to political questions or the faces of political candidates have prompted a 
number of interesting neuropolitics studies, some of the most fascinating findings have emerged 
when nonpolitical tasks have been used to differentiate individuals on opposite sides of the 
political spectrum. Though political scientists have a long tradition of measuring responses to 
political stimuli based on information processing paradigms of political decision-making 1,18,29,55, 
looking for fundamental differences in how the brain processes the world was motivated by 
theoretical insights coming from psychology and cognitive neuroscience 46. David Amodio and 
colleagues 56 found differences in how the brains of liberals and conservatives reacted to a 
version of the Go/No-Go task.  
My colleagues and I 57 were able to accurately differentiate liberals and conservatives 
using brain activity in response to a gambling task, even though the observable gambling 
behavior was identical. A series of studies coming from the University of Nebraska’s political 
science label likewise demonstrated first that there were physiological differences in reactions to 
disgusting stimuli 58 and later that the differences in brain reactivity were large enough that 
ideology could be correctly classified based on brain data after a single disgusting image 59. 
Academy Award-winning actor Colin Firth was a coauthor on one of the studies in this vein after 
commissioning research on the political brain. Their work showed that liberals and conservatives 
could be reliably identified by differences in the size of brain regions implicated in the other 
studies 60. 
 The converging results in even these first few neuropolitics papers are noteworthy, but 
perhaps not surprising. Regions in the Default Mode Network reliably appeared throughout the 
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first studies in social cognitive neuroscience as individuals performed tasks involving the 
contemplation of themselves or their roles in social dynamics 61. And, regions like the amygdala, 
basal ganglia, and insula were investigated precisely because they had been implicated in a range 
of decision-making tasks that researchers believed might be relevant to political cognition 62. 
Nonetheless, it was heartening to see coherent threads emerging as the low hanging fruit was 
sampled from the tree of neuropolitics knowledge. 
Neuropolitics and its neighbors 
 Though the first wave of neuropolitics research produced consistent findings, this line of 
inquiry has not led to the intensity of publications seen in the intersection of neuroscience with 
neighboring disciplines. Neuroeconomics has produced hundreds of papers in top journals and an 
entire academic society (the Society for Neuroeconomics) with annual meetings. Neurolaw has 
similarly generated a cottage industry of law review articles, books and textbooks, a number of 
conferences, and large funding commitments from the MacArthur Foundation 63. So, why does 
neuropolitics appear to lag behind in development? 
 Lawyers and judges have had to deal with cases related to brain function since ancient 
times. Issues of mental capacity and intent can be seen as influencing legal reasoning back to the 
days of stone tablets and the Code of Hammurabi. As cognitive neuroscience provided new tools 
and insights, legal theorists immediately grasped the implications for both broader debates and 
specific cases. While more than a thousand neurolaw articles have been published exploring 
these implications 63, only a rather small portion have actually involved experimental research 
see e.g. 64. Thus, the nature of the discourse in neurolaw has centered on theory building, rather 
than theory testing. 
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 Neuroeconomics, in contrast, was able to connect quickly to the foundations laid by 
behavioral and experimental economics. Behavioral games like the dictator and ultimatum game 
fit nicely within the constraints of fMRI experimental design 65. The same economic task can be 
performed repeatedly inside the scanner with variations in partners, incentives, or costs. While 
many of these games have clear implications for debates in political science 66, political scientists 
and political psychologists often have been interested in experiments with a greater emphasis on 
naturalistic realism 67 or connections to the current political context. 
 Because functional brain imaging typically relies on repeated measures of the same task 
condition, successful neuropolitics studies must involve stimuli that are realistic enough to be 
politically meaningful for the question at hand but also novel enough that each repeated instance 
of the task is engaging for the participant. Given severe constraints and significant variation 
among citizens in their knowledge of national politics 68, experimental design is even more 
complicated when the requirements of functional imaging are added to the mix. As a 
consequence, many successful neuropolitics experiments have involved variations on tasks that 
have already been well tested in more traditional psychological contexts.  
 Neuroeconomics has also benefited from a convergence in research agendas. While many 
economists were questioning the axioms of rational choice theory, psychologists and cognitive 
neuroscientists were pushing their understanding of basic decision-making processes. Thus, the 
levels of analysis of primary concern to these researchers were relatively proximate. The 
interdisciplinary collaboration and funding necessary became routinized as coordinated efforts 
like the Society for Neuroeconomics expanded. 
 Political science and neuroscience have had a much smaller space of intersection. 
Questions at the heart of a lot of social cognitive neuroscience are adjacent to issues central to 
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political science but the critical mass of crossover has yet to be achieved. Political science and 
political psychology have often focused on phenomena at a national or international scale, while 
much of social cognitive neuroscience has focused on dyadic or at most small group dynamics. 
 An interesting and productive counter example has been in racial attitudes. Some of the 
earliest work in social cognitive neuroscience focused on race 35 with a sizeable literature 
emerging in its wake 69 with exciting implications for political science. Racial attitudes have been 
an enticing area of inquiry for these approaches precisely because central concerns about implicit 
attitudes or pressures for social conformity converged with methodological strengths and 
theoretical foundations for understanding how automatic mental processes operated. The 
dynamic and highly contextual nature of racial attitudes 70 along with the well-developed and 
creative experimental designs in this area suggest a ready source for inspiration that prospective 
researchers in neuropolitics should be investigating as we look for workable frameworks that can 
adapted for addressing central questions in political science. 
 Fortunately, as research in adjacent disciplines expands so does the potential for fruitful 
crossover with neuropolitics. As a recent review by Sekoul Krastev and colleagues 71 notes, 
relatively few neuropolitics experiments have leveraged the reward paradigm that is at the center 
of much research in neuroeconomics. Economic theory’s emphasis on individual utility and, in 
particular, on monetary payoffs, contrasts with political values that are often distal from the 
individual making the decision. Justice, equality, patriotism, and other central political values 
can heavily influence discourse and individual decision-making, and it is an open question 
whether expressions of these values rely on the same neural foundations found in 
neuroeconomics. As the points of contact with other related fields increase, new developments in 
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methodologies and research paradigms will enhance the potential for cross-pollinated research in 
neuropolitics. 
 While neuropolitics has not yet had the influence seen in related disciplines, the potential 
identified early 72 remains intact. Insights have been gained in our understanding of prejudice, 
motivated reasoning, attitudes, and ideology 2,73. Early speculation on the distinct roles of 
automatic and controlled processing in political cognition 46 have been borne out as research has 
advanced 74. Moreover, promising leads about the interplay of policy goals and political identity 
are emerging 75.  
 While discussions about the intersections between biology and politics have been 
controversial historically, mindsets have begun to shift. Findings about the biological heritability 
of political attitudes that were largely ignored in an earlier era 22, have become some of the most 
cited works 76 in contemporary political science decades later. A number of researchers have 
investigated evolutionary roots of political behavior 77,78. And while no academic society devoted 
solely to neuropolitics has emerged, this work can far more easily find outlets in a variety of 
professional associations, divisions, interest groups, and scholarly journals that cater to work at 
the intersection of biology and politics more broadly 79. Thus, while few political scientists 
would believe that their field is really a subdiscipline within biology 80, many are far more open 
to the potential value for understanding biology and the brain in the context of politics than was 
previously the case. 
The future of neuropolitics 
 Though fMRI has enabled an explosion in research in cognitive neuroscience and related 
disciplines over the years, it has some rather severe limitations, especially in relation to 
neuropolitics. For one, equipment costs run into the millions of dollars and require a significant 
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staff with technical expertise to maintain the delicate apparatus and run the machine. Participants 
in fMRI experiments must lie very still at the center of a large super-conducting magnet. As a 
consequence, the possibilities for the actual social interactions that underpin politics are severely 
constrained and the types of stimuli and tasks that may be used are quite limited. The result is an 
experimental set-up far from the naturalistic environments that can boost external validity in 
political psychology research 67. Additionally, while fMRI filled the methodological gap 
identified in the late 1980s, it is still restricted in terms of temporal resolution and causal 
inference due to fundamental characteristics of the method. The sibling disciplines to 
neuropolitics are taking advantage of alternative approaches to fMRI in order to sidestep its 
limitations and neuropolitics will need to follow suit as it develops. 
EEG 
 One solution to the temporal resolution problem is the use of EEG. With this technique, 
millisecond resolution is attainable, rather than being stuck with the one-second resolution of 
fMRI. The traditional limitation of EEG techniques has been the difficulties with localization of 
the signal source within the brain, since EEG measures electrical activity along the surface of the 
scalp. However, the development of high-density event related potential (ERP) techniques means 
that a set of 128 (or more) electrodes along the scalp can provide data which enables inferences 
about the activity of even deep brain structures like the amygdala as it responds within 100 
millisecsonds after a social stimulus 81,82. This temporal resolution is valuable since it facilitates 
inference about the sequence of neural activity and thus causal structure of mental functions. 
Moreover, because the data is gathered via a hairnet-like device rather than in the center of a 
giant magnet, the participant is able to experience a far more natural range of interactions and 
stimuli. 
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fNIRS 
 Like the high-density ERP approach, functional Near Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) uses 
a hairnet of sensors situated on the scalp. However, rather than measuring electrical activity, 
fNIRS uses laser diodes and photodiode detectors to send photons of light through the head and 
detect changes in the passage of those photons. The most commonly used variant is continuous 
wave (CW), which detects shifts in blood flow that correspond with underlying neural activity, in 
a manner similar to fMRI. Not surprisingly, fMRI and fNIRS produce equivalent results across a 
range of cognitive tasks 83. Connected to the same shifts in metabolism and blood flow, the two 
approaches share many of the same limitations. For instance, though very quick fluctuations in 
light can be detected in fNIRS, the practical temporal resolution is constrained to the slow shifts 
over seconds as the blood oxygenation levels change to support neural activity. But, fNIRS is 
significantly cheaper than fMRI, can be used in more naturalistic settings, is dramatically quieter, 
and less susceptible to motion artifacts than either fMRI or EEG/ERP measures 84.  
One significant limitation to fNIRS is that the technique can only directly detect changes 
in blood oxygenation at a depth of 2 to 3 cm. So while much of the outer cortex can be studied, 
activity in deep brain structures such as the amygdala are not directly observable. Nonetheless, 
given the brain’s connectivity, some evidence demonstrates the possibility of inferring deep 
brain activity from measurable changes in the outer cortex 85. 
EROS 
 Event related optical signal, or EROS 86, relies on changes in optical scattering that occur 
when neural tissue is active. Because the technique focuses specifically on neural activity, rather 
than relatively slow changes in blood flow correlated with neural activity, the approach allows 
for temporal resolution below 100 milliseconds and is much closer to the source at interest. 
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While EROS provides a more direct measure of neural activity, it cannot provide insight into 
neural structure. Thus, to ensure accurate understanding of the neuroanatomy involved in the 
task, this approach typically relies on structural MRI in addition to optical imaging. This dual 
approach to data collection naturally limits utilization due to equipment costs and the effort 
involved in collecting data from two sources. Additionally, significant concerns have been raised 
about how consistently findings using the EROS approach can be replicated87,88. 
Investigating disruptions in brain activity 
  While a variety of imaging methods all seek to make inferences about mental function by 
looking at brain activity, another approach is to investigate disruptions of activity. The famous 
case of Phineas Gage 89, who suffered trauma to the left frontal lobe and experienced significant 
personality changes, and the aphasic patients of Paul Broca 26, who suffered damage to the region 
named after him, provided foundational insights into cognitive processes through disorders in 
brain function. In my dissertation 47, I proposed using patients suffering from anterograde 
amnesia to test hypotheses from Milton Lodge and others 90 regarding “online” impressions of 
candidates. Jason Coronel and colleagues 91 later carried out this research out as part of his 
dissertation92, showing that amnesic patients who are unable to recall previous information about 
the political issue positions of candidates can nonetheless have their attitudes about the 
candidates altered by the same information they cannot recall having seen. 
 Just as they have been vital for neuroscience since its earliest days, patient populations 
can provide powerful opportunities for future neuropolitics research. The tragedy of brain-
injured Vietnam veterans has led to decades of important insights, with studies of veterans who 
sustained damage to their prefrontal cortex adding to prior work. Findings have provided 
important insights concerning theory of mind, goal directed social behavior, moral judgment, 
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emotional intelligence, stereotypes, and a wide range of social cognition 93. Since the 
development of the Vietnam head injury study, a number of projects have gathered brain injury 
patients and benefited from their participation in a wide range of studies. Researchers in 
neuropolitics should benefit from collaborations with neurologists and neuropsychiatrists who 
work with patient populations and are interested in understanding the political implications of 
brain injury 73,94. 
 Beyond brain injury, a wide range of patient populations can yield insights for questions 
at the heart of political science. Individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD), for 
instance, have a stronger tendency to idealize or devalue. As a consequence, such individuals 
then have a more difficult time restoring reciprocity in an iterated trust game 95, have stronger 
reactivity in mPFC to experiencing social exclusion 96, and possess stronger negative stereotypes 
regarding social outgroups 97. With half of all Americans experiencing an episode of mental 
illness during their lifetime 98, understanding the implications for political attitudes and political 
behaviors is critical. By investigating the particular ways that specific disorders alter our political 
psychology we can enhance our understanding of the mental and emotional processes that 
underlie our political world. Additionally, benefits can obtain for the patient populations, as the 
iterated trust game appeared strongly diagnostic for BPD, a notoriously difficult condition to 
diagnose 95. 
 Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) is a technique that can temporarily disrupt the 
function of a specific brain region through the introduction of a focused magnetic field. In this 
way, TMS mimics the effect of a lesion, but only for a short time and without lasting effects. The 
approach is particularly useful for testing hypotheses about the specific contribution of a brain 
region to a broader mental process. For instance, Liane Young and colleagues 99 used TMS to 
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disrupt the right temporoparietal junction (RTJP) in order to show that undermining the function 
of that area also impaired participants’ ability to take account of mental states when making 
moral judgments. Though RTJP had been implicated previously in functional imaging studies 
looking at our ability to infer the mental states of others, showing that disruptions to the region 
also impairs that ability strengthens the case. As with other types of lesion studies, TMS enables 
a much stronger set of inferences about causation than is typically available with functional 
imaging approaches. However, TMS is limited to the regions of the brain closest to the scalp, 
thus deeper brain areas are inaccessible. 
 An alternative to TMS is transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) which uses a 
relatively simple device to create weak electrical currents that modifies neural excitability and 
activity 100. The method has a lot in common with TMS in terms of both potential and limitations. 
However, the technology is much simpler and inexpensive, and thus it can be used affordably on 
multiple participants at the same time. For example, in one study researchers were able to use 
tDCS simultaneously on six participants who were playing ultimatum games with a series of 12 
partners101. Compared with a placebo condition, those who had their right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex activity disrupted by tDCS were more likely to accept unfair offers.  Note that some 
researchers have questioned the replicability of tDCS as a measure, however102. 
 One important limit common to both TMS and tDCS is that deep brain structures are out 
of reach. However, a new technique looks to transcend this problem, without the need for 
neurosurgery. By applying a high-frequency oscillating electrical field at multiple locations on 
the scalp it is possible to drive activity in deep neural tissue without disrupting cortical 
structures. Though currently only demonstrated with a mouse model, researchers expect to apply 
it to humans 103. As a consequence, neural activity in the amygdala or hippocampus could soon 
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be altered temporarily in neuropolitical studies to help isolate the role of these deep structures in 
a variety of political experiences, processes, and behaviors. 
 Moving forward, neuropolitics will also want to take advantage of developmental 
approaches to political psychology. Though historically important work has been done on the 
development of political attitudes and behaviors in children 104,105, this area of inquiry has been 
significantly undervalued in political science in recent years 106, especially compared with the 
broader work in contemporary developmental psychology 107 and developmental social 
neuroscience 108. For instance, while the biological heritability of political attitudes is quite stable 
across the adult lifespan, early political attitudes are entirely dominated by the effects of 
socialization 109. The evidence from genopolitics then leads to contradictory expectations about 
what might occurring in the development of childrens’ political brains. 
 Another important direction for the future will involve combinations of the previously 
described approaches. Francesca Happé and Uta Frith 110 have argued for deeper theorizing about 
atypical social cognition from a developmental neuroscience view. For example, the fact that 
racial stereotyping, but not gender stereotyping, is impaired in children with Williams syndrome 
111 provides further confirmation of an evolutionary psychology account of the origins of racial 
discrimination as built on mechanisms for coalitional cognition 112—which are impaired in 
Williams patients. 
 Because of the lower costs of some of the methods mentioned, it is also possible to use 
them simultaneously and with multiple participants. Simultaneous imaging of multiple 
participants is known as hyperscanning and when combined with the freedom associated with 
running subjects outside of an fMRI scanner, it can lead to far more naturalistic experiments. In a 
study of social ranking behaviors, pairs of participants were examined using fNIRS, EEG/ERP, 
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and response times 113, enabling multiple measures of mental processes. Other studies have used 
functional imaging approaches with both neurotypical and clinical populations (like BPD) to 
understand how patients with these conditions compare with typical individuals in a range of 
social cognition tasks 95,96. As neuropolitics research develops and becomes more sophisticated, 
presenting converging lines of evidence across methodologies will be critical for fostering 
confidence that findings are not mere artifacts of the experimental procedure or lab situation. 
 Finally, while fMRI devices with a magnetic field strength of 3 Tesla are now relatively 
common, more powerful machines have come on the scene in recent years. Ultra high field 
devices, such as 7 Tesla fMRI scanners, are still relatively new but initial studies have 
demonstrated benefits relevant to the future of neuropolitics. In particular, regions like the 
amygdala have been difficult to image given the spatial resolution of typical 3T fMRI studies 
and other constraints, but with 7T fMRI significantly smaller voxels (the the 3D version of 
pixels) can be, enabling far greater precision given the spatial and temporal tradeoffs 114. The 
greater precision and sensitivity of 7T has led to an increasing number of research centers using 
these devices. However, the time needed to acquire each slice means that imaging the whole 
brain can provide a challenge 115 and additional artifacts from the imaging process must be 
managed 116. As researchers continue to develop proficiency with the nuances of 7T imaging, 
many of the hurdles are being overcome and the new approach is yielding promising results 117. 
Conceptualizing experiments: ROI and whole brain analysis 
 While the new measurement tools bode well for a future of neuropolitics research where 
the costs are much lower and the experimental conditions far more naturalistic, an important 
fundamental shift is coming in terms of new ways of conceptualizing experiments. Two 
particular advances involve the use of machine learning for data analysis and the paradigm of 
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neuroforecasting. Even while utilizing familiar equipment, these techniques provide qualitatively 
different ways of viewing the enterprise of neuropolitics. 
 The traditional approach to brain imaging focuses on two strategies for data analysis. The 
first, region of interest (ROI) analysis, hypothesizes that a specific brain region is involved in the 
cognitive task of interest and tests that hypothesis by extracting data from that region to compare 
activity in task and control conditions. This approach derives from the localization hypothesis 
that is at the core of much neuroscience work, namely, that there are discrete regions of the brain 
that are engaged in specific mental activities. By measuring the activity in a particular region, we 
can then infer the engagement of a specific mental process. The ROI approach is most powerful 
when used in a context where there are strong reasons to believe that a particular region is 
involved in a particular cognitive task. One problem is that researchers are often unclear which 
mental tasks or brain regions might be involved in the phenomena of interest. By limiting 
investigation to a specific region, one might miss critically important activity in other areas. 
 This limitation can be circumvented by a second approach, referred to as whole brain 
analysis. In both ROI and whole brain analysis, data might be collected for the entire brain at 
once; the difference is in the analysis of the data collected. With whole brain analysis, the 
strategy is to run statistical comparisons for each of the brains’ thousands of voxels, then correct 
for many simultaneous analyses, and set a statistical threshold for the reliability of the clusters of 
activity that result. In this way, researchers can discover unexpected engagement with the task 
regardless of where in the brain it occurs. One downside is that this type of analysis often leads 
to “see what lights up” experimental designs that are driven by overly vague theory that “the 
brain is probably doing something different when you do this task of interest than when you do 
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not.” The resulting activity might then be subject to post-hoc interpretations that get reframed in 
writing up the hypothesis test.  
In some cases, an ROI analysis is carried out after the whole brain analysis in a manner 
that can trigger inference problems, and in particular puzzlingly high correlations, similar to the 
issue of selecting on the dependent variable (choosing cases based on a criteria and then using 
the cases as evidence of the criteria) familiar in political science 118. While some papers are 
overzealous in their analyses of unexpected results from whole brain analyses, there can also be a 
problem of sweeping a puzzling finding under the rug or sticking it in supplemental materials 
without further mention see discussion in 70. 
 A more fundamental issue arises from the conceptual framework of localization. While 
there is considerable evidence of the connection between particular brain regions and specific 
mental processes, the brain is also extremely interconnected and mental processes are often 
distributed. Thus, looking at one voxel, one anatomical region, or one activation cluster can give 
a false impression of how much, and what parts, of the brain exactly are engaged during the 
processing of a task. Rather than focusing on specific regions, clusters, or networks within the 
brain, machine-learning approaches often leverage all of the data from a whole brain scan in 
order to model the phenomena of interest. 
Machine learning approaches 
 Typical fMRI analysis relies on the familiar logic of regression, using a General Linear 
Model based on the experimental parameters to predict the time series of data in a particular 
voxel. Typical machine learning approaches reverse this logic, predicting the experimental 
parameters based on the activity in many voxels 119. In this alternative view, fMRI data analysis 
is considered to be a pattern classification problem—is the pattern of brain activity associated 
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with one mental function or another 120? After training the classifier with an example set of data, 
researchers can see how well the classifier is able to correctly classify the testing set. This 
alternative view of the data analytic process also opens up new research paradigms for 
exploration. 
 Neuropolitics researchers have used machine-learning algorithms to classify individuals 
as liberal or conservative based upon brain structure or function 59,60. One study was able to 
correctly classify a person as liberal or conservative with about 85 percent accuracy based on a 
single disgusting stimulus (Ahn et al., 2014). However, the machine learning approach allows for 
even more provocative applications such as “mind-reading” (inferring perceptual, emotional, and 
cognitive states from brain imaging data) and “neuroforecasting” (inferring the future behavior 
of individuals or mass populations from brain activity in small groups of individuals). 
 The conventional use of fMRI data has been in forward inference, where the data 
resulting from an fMRI experiment is used to distinguish between two competing theories about 
the engagement of neural mechanisms 121. Attempts to use fMRI for reverse inference, making 
claims about mental processes based upon activity in specific brain regions for instance, have 
been far more problematic 122—especially in the context of neuropolitics 123. One challenge is that 
this use of data suffers from a fallacy akin to affirming the consequent. Thus, while a series of 
studies have shown that size or engagement of the amygdala is correlated with conservatism 
(forward inference), it remains unclear what mental function or trait (threat, fear, anxiety, social 
cognition, etc.) is driving the observed differences (reverse inference). 
 The use of machine-learning approaches, however, has strengthened the ability to make 
inferences from fMRI data. After training, a classifier algorithm can be used to distinguish which 
mental task an individual is performing. For instance, after tuning an algorithm to a training set 
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of data containing photos of different objects (e.g., faces, houses, cats, shoes, chairs, and so on), 
the algorithm can then be used to identify when a person is viewing a cat 124. Beyond mere “mind 
reading” of object category perception, however, is the capacity to successfully interpret a range 
of more nuanced brain activity 120, such as the identification of specific stimuli based on fMRI 
data (e.g., knowing whether a person is thinking about a specific dog, rather than the general 
category of dogs) 125 or the semantic content of natural movies (e.g,. Were you watching a man 
walking or a school of fish swimming?) 126. While earlier research often led to extensive caveats 
about our ability to infer mental states, emotions, or perceptions based on brain activity, many of 
those caveats have fallen to the continued progress in methodology.  
Neuroforecasting 
 Elliot Berkman and Emily Falk 127 have argued for another new theoretical direction for 
the analysis of fMRI data which neuropolitics will benefit from. Both the traditional forward 
inference from fMRI and the more problematic reverse inference approaches have focused upon 
the connection between psychological processes and neural mechanisms. Political science, 
however, has often been more concerned about real world behaviors, and shunned inquiry into 
the mental events behind them. Berkman, Falk, and others have demonstrated the potential for 
the prediction of these real world outcomes directly from brain imaging data. 
 While mind reading from an individual highlights a number of surprising ethical 
problems that neuropolitics will need to address, developing work in neuroforecasting suggests it 
is possible to not only predict the future behavior of individuals but to predict the behaviors of 
large numbers of people based upon brain activity in a much smaller group. One of first studies 
in this direction predicted the use of sunscreen days after participants had been brain imaged 
while viewing material encouraging skin protection 128. Later it was shown that smoking 
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reduction could be predicted a month later by brain activity while participants watched anti-
smoking messages 129. In both cases, the predictions of future behaviors were improved with the 
fMRI data beyond self-report measures, consistent with a large body of literature regarding the 
function of both our consciously accessible and automatic mental processes 130,131. When brain 
imaging and self-report data are combined, behaviors in the future can sometimes be accurately 
forecast. 
 The next step in this line of research has investigated whether the real world behaviors of 
large numbers of people can be predicted based on a smaller set of test groups. One study, again 
focusing on smokers, examined neural responses to a series of smoking cessation ads and found 
that the likelihood of members of the general public calling 1-800-QUIT NOW after each of the 
test ads could be predicted by the brain activity of the smaller group 132. Another study, in 
neuroeconomics, used brain activity within a small number of people who responded to real-
world requests for microloans to successfully predict whether those requests would be successful 
at the level of the real market 133.  
 While traditional focus group approaches have long been used in advertising and can 
account for as much as half the variance in population-level responsiveness to ads, retail 
entrepreneur John Wanamaker’s complaint a century ago that an unknown half of all advertising 
is wasted still remains true. However, one neuromarketing comparison of traditional focus group 
self report data with a range of indirect measurement techniques, including Implicit Association 
Tests, eye tracking, EEG, biometrics, and fMRI, showed that only fMRI data could dramatically 
improve on the insights gained from self report. Researchers were able to account for 85.6 
percent of the variation in responsiveness to ads run by a six large corporations in real world 
market conditions, a 59.4 percent improvement over the use of self report alone 134. 
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Discussion 
 The use of neuroscientific methods to ascertain the political attitudes and behaviors of 
individuals and large portions of the population, however, should give us pause. For one, the 
broader implications of these rapidly materializing techniques need to be developed. Ideological 
purity has often demanded by both authoritarians and (on occasion) democracies attempting to 
root out perceived enemies from within. How would the purges of Joseph Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, 
or even Joseph McCarthy have differed if they had the tools of neuropolitics at hand? Will the 
selections of party nominees or Supreme Court justices someday be influenced by brain scans? 
As distasteful as these possibilities may sound, how long will it take until the neuromarketing 
techniques that are currently influencing other sectors of society come into full play in the 
political domain? Trends would indicate not that long.  
 Already, some are engaged in practical neuropolitics, but the ethical implications and the 
threats to democratic deliberation are woefully underappreciated—and under-theorized. Days 
after a recent New York Times article highlighted the use of neuropolitics methods to sway a 
Mexican political campaign 135, the governing party vowed to stop using the approach 136. The 
founder of one of the firms involved claimed, “We cannot read minds and of course we cannot 
change them.” However, the developing work in neuropolitics suggests that these aims are 
increasingly within reach. The reporting intimates that campaigns around the world have already 
started using these tools, including for presidential elections in the U.S. 
 Neuropolitics, a field studying the most complex thing known to humans that likely 
evolved due to the demands created by exactly the context we want to understand it operating in, 
is still in its infancy 4. An analogy from biology illuminates where the field currently stands. The 
C. elegans worm is a model species with 302 neurons in its tiny brain that have been laboriously 
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mapped out 137. But even then, we are far from being able to fully understand the function of this 
worm’s brain, much less the role its brain plays in its very simple social life 138. The human 
brain, in contrast, has around eighty-six billion neurons and a hundred trillion synapses. It is the 
result of a three million year cognitive arms race within the species to compete for survival while 
paying the ever increasing metabolic costs to feed this device that converts glucose into love and 
hate, poetry and war. As our understanding of the brain is developing, old notions that our brains 
are somehow hardwired are giving way to a realization that they are wired to be flexible 
precisely because of the pressures of being a political animal. In the long run, the field has the 
potential to fundamentally change the way we understand human nature. But we are just taking 
the first steps in that journey. 
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